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FIRST AMENDMENT-OBSCENITY AND INDECENCY
Pinkus v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1808 (1978)
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation. 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978)
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court last term attempted to de-
fine further the standards for determining the ob-
scenity vel non of mailed materials. In Pinkus v.
United Statesi the Court ruled, inter alia, that chil-
dren are not to be included as a part of the
community by whose standards obscenity is to be
judged. However, the inclusion of sensitive adults
was considered proper in the formulation of that
community standard. Also, in Federal Communica-
tions Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,2 the Court
held that the Federal Communications Commis-
sion had the power to regulate the content and
context of a radio broadcast which was indecent
but not obscene.
DiscussioN OF CASES
In Pinkus, the Court sought to resolve the ambi-
guities surrounding the definition of "contempo-
rary community standards," as used by the Court
in Roth v. United States to define obscene materials."
The Roth standards for obscenity, as particularized
in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,5 stated that materials
could be found obscene when: (a) the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is pat-
ently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters; and (c) the ma-
terial is utterly without redeeming social value.
6
The Court redefined obscenity in Miller v. Cali-
' 98 S. Ct. 1808 (1978).
298 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
3354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4 The acts with which Pinkus was charged, infra note
12, occurred prior to the decision of Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973), making the Roth-Memoirs standards
applicable to that case. See Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188 (1977), holding "that the Due Process Clause
[of the Fifth Amendment] precludes the application to
petitioners of the standards announced in Miller v. Cali-
fornia, to the extent that those standards may impose
criminal liability for conduct not punishable under Mem-
oirs. " Id. at 196.
r383 U.S. 413 (1966).
6 Id. at 418.
fornia 7 finding the "utterly without redeeming so-
cial value" requirement of Roth and its progeny to
be a prosecutorial burden "virtually impossible to
discharge under our criminal standards of proof."8
Under the present day Miller standards, the trier of
fact in an obscenity case must determine:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest... (b) whether the work depicts or describes
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value?
The petitioner in Pinkus v. United States'? was
charged with violation of a federal obscenity stat-
ute."1 The acts upon which the charges were based
occurred in 197 1,12 necessitating the application of
the Roth'3 standards to the determination of ob-
scenity vel non. 4 The district court failed to apply
the Roth standards, 5 and cast its instructions to the
7413 U.S. 15 (1973).
8 Id. at 22.
9 Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
10 98 S. Ct. 1808.
1 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976) in relevant part provides:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or
vile article, matter, thing, device or substance...
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall
not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any
post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing,
carriage in the mails, or delivery of anything de-
clared by this section ... to be nonmailable... shall
be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both, for the first such
offense, and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, for
each such offense thereafter.
12 The 11 count indictment charged Pinkus with hav-
ing: "mailed obscene illustrated brochures advertising sex
films, books, magazines and playing cards; the magazine
'Bedplay'; and an 8 mm. film, 'No. 613,' to addresses in
Nevada, New York, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Texas, and New
Jersey." United States v. Pinkus, 551 F. 2d 1155, 1156 n.
I (9th Cir. 1977).
13 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14 See note 4 supra.
15 98 S. Ct. at 1810. The District Court's decision was
not published.
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jury in a definition of obscenity under the Miller16
standards. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit remanded the case17 to the dis-
trict court for a new trial under the appropriate
standards. On retrial in 1976, petitioner was again
convicted, fined and sentenced on the original
charges.18 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, peti-
tioner challenged four parts of the jury instructions
and the trial court's exclusion of assertedly com-
parable materials, which were claimed to have had
enjoyed commerial and popular success through-
out the country. That court affirmed the convic-
tion, finding no reversible error in the jury instruc-
tions.' 9 In upholding one instruction which in-
cluded children as a part of the community by
whose standard obscenity was to have been judged,
the circuit court noted that the "Supreme Court
has both upheld a conviction involving the inclu-
sion of children in the community [see Roth v. United
States, 345 U.S. 476 .... I and intimated that it
does not necessarily approve such a charge. See
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465 n.3 ...
(1966).' '
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case back to the court of appeals, acknowledging
its prior ambivalence on whether children should
be included in the relevant community. The ma-
jority opinion 2' held that children are not to be
included in the relevant community and reasoned
that their inclusion might produce in the jury's eye
a much lower "average person"' 2 than would result
if they "restricted their consideration to the effect
of allegedly obscene materials on aduts."23 The
Court observed that in the same term in which
16413 U.S. 15 (1973).
" United States v. Pinkus, No. 73-2900 (9th Cir. Feb.
5, 1975, rehearing denied May 13, 1975).
18 98 S. Ct. 1810. The District Court's decision was not
published.
'
9United States v. Pinkus, 551 F. 2d 1155 (9th Cir.
1977). Pinkus challenged those jury instructions which
included children and sensitive persons as part of the
relevant community, as well as the instruction to consider
the material's appeal to the prurient interest of deviant
groups and the appellant's alleged involvement in the
business of pandering.
20 Id at 1158.
" The Court's opinion was written by Chief Justice
Burger and joined by Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and
White. Justice Stewart concurred in a separate opinion,
as did Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justices Stew-
art and Marshall. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opin-
ion.
' The Court held, inter alia, in Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291, 304 (1977), that, "obscenity is to be judged
according to the average person idf the community, rather
than the most prudish or the most tolerant."
2' 98 S. Ct. at 1812.
Roth was decided, it had reversed a conviction
under a state statute proscribing the dissemination
of a book "found to have a potentially deleterious
influence upon youth." 24 The decision in Pinkus
followed the logic of that ruling'4 by preventing
the content of adult material from being governed
by the community's concern for the protection of
the morals of youth;26 or, as Mr. Justice Frank-
furter euphemistically stated, "burn[ing] the house
to roast the pig.'
' 7
However, the Pinkus Court did not find error in
the inclusion of sensitive adults in the jury instruc-
tions defining the relevant community by whose
standards obscenity is to be judged. The Court
found petitioner's reliance on passages from Miller
and Smith v. United States?4 to have been misplaced.
The Court ruled that the allusions to the "average
person" in those passages30 was to emphasize an
issue central to Roth, that "judging obscenity by
the effect of isolated passages upon the most sus-
ceptible persons, might well encompass material
legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be
rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the free-
dom of speech and press." 3' The Court held that
"[i]n the narrow and limited context of this case, '
the community includes all adults who comprise
it." 33 Whereas a jury should not use any particu-
larly sensitive or insensitive persons or groups as a
standard, it should include both the sensitive and
insensitive person, however defined,' when deter-
mining the "collective view of the community.'"
The petitioner in Pinkus also challenged the pro-
priety of the trial court's instructions as to deviant
I rd (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383
(1957)).
25Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
26 There was no evidence in Pinkus that children had
received, or were likely to have received, the challenged
materials. 98 S. Ct. at 1812.
"352 U.S. at 383.
28413 U.S. 15 (1971).
29431 U.S. 291 (1977).
30 413 U.S. at 33; 431 U.S. at 304. Both the Miller and
Smith Courts held, inter atia, that the community standard
was to be based on the "average person" in the commu-
nity and not on the most sensitive or insensitive person.
354 U.S. at 489.
Although the Court did not explicitly state what the
"narrow and limited context of this case" was, reference
may have been made to the fact that children and
unconsenting adults were not exposed to the mailed
materials.
3398 S. Ct. at 1813.
34 The Court did not attempt to define the terms
"sensitive" and "insensitive" person, leaving that deter-
mination to the discretion of the individual jurors.
3598 S. Ct. at 1813.
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groups3 6 and pandering.3 7 He had contended that
to support an instruction on the material's appeal
to the prurient interests of deviants, the prosecution
must come forward with evidence to guide the jury
in the application of such an instruction. The
Court disagreed, however, and held that Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slatons required the prosecution to
introduce expert testimony only where the "con-
tested materials are directed at such a bizarre
deviant group that the experience of the trier of
fact would be plainly inadequate to judge whether
the material appeals to the [particular] prurient
interest. 3 9 The Court found that the materials
involved in Pinkus were not directed at "bizarre
deviant groups"4 ° and, accordingly, could be ex-
amined by the jurors without the aid of expert
testimony.4 1
The Court also rejected the petitioner's challenge
to the instructions that allowed the jury to consider
the setting in which the materials were presented,4 2
that is, evidence of pandering. 43 Relying on its
3 The challenged jury instruction read in the disjunc-
tive, stating that the materials could be found to be
obscene if they constitute an "appeal to the prurient
interest of the average person or the prurient interest of
members of a deviant sexual group at the time of mail-
ing." Id. at 1814 (emphasis added).
37 The jury instruction on pandering stated:
You must make the decision whether the materials
are obscene under the test I have given you. In
making that determination you are not limited to
the materials themselves. In addition, you may con-
sider the setting in which they are presented. Ex-
amples of what you may consider in this regard are
such things as: manner of distribution, circumstances
of production, sale and advertising.
United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d at 1159.
38413 U.S. 49 (1973). Paris involved the display of
"adult" films by a commercial movie theater, allegedly
in violation of a Georgia obscenity statute. The Court
held, inter alia, that states have a "legitimate interest in
regulating commerce in obscene material and in regulat-
ing exhibition of obscene material in places of public
accomodation, including so-called 'adult' theaters," and
reversed petitioner's conviction and remanded the case
for a determination of obscenity vel non under the Miller
standards. Id. at 69-70.
"Id. at 56 n.3.
40 "The witness testified that there was an appeal in
the materials to the prurient interests of homosexuals,
sadomasochists and those interested in group sex."
United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d at 1158 n.7.
4 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 100
(1974), and Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,465
(1966).42 See note 37 supra.
43 Pandering was defined by the Ginzburg Court as "the
business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly
advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their cus-
tomers." 383 U.S. at 467 (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957)) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
decisions in Splawn v. California4 and Hamling v.
United States,4 5 the Court ruled that, in a close case,
ajury may consider the "touting descriptions along
with the materials themselves to determine whether
they were intended to appeal to the recipient's pru-
rient interest in sex, [or] whether they were 'com-
mercial exploitation of erotica-solely for the sake
of their prurient appeal., 46 The Court held, fur-
ther, that the prosecution need only present the
mailings and the names, locations and occupations
of the recipients as evidence to satisfy the require-
ments necessary to "trigger the Ginzburg pandering
instruction. 4 7
The concurrences filed in Pinkus by Justice Ste-
vens and by Justice Brennan, in which Justices
Stewart and Marshall joined, expressed a disfavor
with the direction of the law of obscenity. Concur-
ring in the holding solely because the plurality had
relied faithfully on precedent and had refused to
re-examine this area of the law, Justice Stevens
reiterated the view he had expressed in past cases
concerning Section 146 I's 48 proscription of obscene
materials. Stevens has questioned the propriety of
a federal criminal obscenity statute which is ap-
plied without a uniform national standard.4 9 Ste-
vens has also noted that, regardless of whether a
national or local standard is applicable, the "intol-
erably vague"' 5 constitutional standards governing
prosecutions under Section 1461 permit so much
subjectivity in the jury's determination ofobscenity
vel non that "evenhanded enforcement of the law is
a virtual impossibility.""1 For these reasons, Stevens
has concluded that the value of purportedly ob-
scene materials should be determined in "the free
marketplace of ideas, 5 12 and not by means of crim-
inal prosecutions.
4 431 U.S. 595 (1977). The Splawn Court held, inter
alia, that, "There is no doubt that as a matter of First
Amendment obscenity law, evidence of pandering ... is
relevant in determining whether the material is obscene."
Id. at 598.
4 418 U.S. at 130.
46 98 S. Ct. at 1815 (emphasis added) (quoting Ginz-
burg v. United States, 383 U.S. at 466).
4 98 S. Ct. at 1815. Petitioner also challenged the
exclusion of comparison evidence. The Court held that
in light of its disposition of the case, the issue of admis-
sibility of comparison evidence was not before the Court.
The Court noted that the fines levied against Pinkus were
cumulative and left the issue of admissibility to the court
of appeals.
48 18 U.S.C. § 1461. See note 11 supra.49 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 311
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
s1i.
52431 U.S. at 321 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and
Marshall, concurred in Pinkus, stating a fundamen-
tal disagreement with the Court which transcended
the facts and issues of that case. Brennan chal-
lenged the corpus juris supporting the proscription
of obscene material. He claimed that section 1461
was "clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its
face."' ss This, perhaps, should be read in conjunc-
tion with Justice Brennan's past statement that:
"at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles
or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit State
and Federal Governments from attempting wholly
to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis
of their allegedly 'obscene' contents."' 4 According
to Justice Brennan, any statute which proscribed
the sale or distribution of obscene materials to all
persons was considered overincltsive and, therefore
violated the first amendment.'
In Federal Communications Commission v. Padfica
Foundation,w the Court dealt with the relationship
between the actions taken by a regulatory agency
pursuant to a federal statute57 and the first amend-
ments8 The respondent in the case owned and
operated a radio station which made an afternoon
broadcast of George Carlin's satiric monologue,
"Filthy Words." ss The Commission, after forward-
ing a listener's complaint to the radio station and
receiving the station's response, issued a declara-
Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 777 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
53 98 S. Ct. at 1816 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
Millican v. United States, 418 U.S. 947, 948 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) and United States v. Orito, 413
U.S. 139, 148 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
" Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
5 The sole dissenting opinion in Pbus was filed by
Justice Powell, who agreed with the Court that children
should not be included as part of the relevant community,
but who found such an inclusion a harmless error within
the factual context of the Pinkus case. 98 S. Ct. at 1816
(Powell, J., dissenting).
5 98 S. Ct. at 3026.
575 U.S.C. § 554(e)(1976) provides: "The agency, with
like effect as in the case of other orders, and in its sound
discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a
controversy or remove uncertainty."
5 U.S. CoNsr. amend. 1.
r Carlin's monologue saterized society's attitude to-
ward certain expletives, "the words you couldn't say on
the public, ah, airwaves, urn, the ones you definitely
wouldn't say." 98 S. Ct. at 3041 (appendix to the Court's
opinion). The expletives, as used in the monologue, did
not present an appeal to a prurient interest and, therefore,
were not found to have been obscene. Id at 3035-36.
tory order granting the complaint.' Although the
Commission did not impose formal sanctions on
the respondent for its violation of a federal stat-
61
ute, the Commission stated that the order would
be "associated with the station's license file, and in
the event that subsequent complaints are received,
the Commission will then decide whether it should
utilize any of the available sanctions it has been
granted by Congress. 'e2 After issuing the order, the
Commission declined to clarify .its opinion beyond
the "specific factual context" of the respondent's
case.' On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, the Commis-
sion's decision was reversed, with each of the three
judges on the panel writing separatelyb 4
In a plurality opinion6 the United States Su-
preme Court reversed the court of appeals in a
decision which required both statutory and consti-
tutional interpretation. Holding that the appropri-
656 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). The Commission stated in
its opinion that it sought to regulate indecent speech,
such as that found in the Carlin monologue, using prin-
ciples analogous to those governing the law of nuisance
where the "law generally speaks to channeling behavior
more than actually prohibiting it." I'. at 98.
61 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) provides: "Whoever uttcrs
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communication shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
62 98 S. Ct. at 3030 n.1 (quoting Pacifica Foundation
v. FCC, 56 F.C.C.2d at 96). The Commission noted:
Congress has specifically empowered the FCC to (1)
revoke a station's license (2) issue a cease and desist
order, or (3) impose a monetary forfeiture for a
violation of Section 1464, 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a).
312(b), 503(b)(l)(E). The FCC can also (4) deny
license renewal or (5)- grant a short term renewal, 47
U.S.C. §§ 307, 308.
63 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 893 (1976).
64 Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1977). The opinion submitted by Judge Tamm stated
that the Commission's order constituted a form of cen-
sorship expressly prohibited by § 326 of the Communi-
cations Act. Alternatively, Judge Tamm read the Com-
mission's opinion as the functional equivalent of an order
and found it to be "overbroad and vague." Id. at 18.
Concurring in the result, Chief Judge Bazelon founded
his objections to the Commission's order on constitutional
grounds. He concluded that § 1464 must be narrowly
construed, proscribing only that language which is ob-
scene or otherwise unprotected by the first amendment.
Id. at 24-30. Judge Leventhal, in dissent, stated that the
state's interest in the protection of children provided a
sufficient basis for the FCC'S regulation of the language
"as broadcast." Id at 31.
s The opinion was written by Stevens, J., and joined
by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., Powell, J., joined by
Blackmun, J., concurred in a separate opinion. Brennan,
J., filed a dissent and was joined by Marshall, J., Stewart,
J., filed a separate dissent and was joined by Brennan,
White and Marshall, JJ.
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ate focus of review for the Court was on the Com-
mission's determination that the Carlin monologue
was indecent as broadcast, the Court addressed
two statutory issues: whether the Commission's
action was forbidden censorship within the mean-
ing of Section 32666 and whether speech which is
indecent, but not obscene, may be regulated under
Section 1464.7 The Court ruled that Section 326
of the Communications Act did not limit the Com-
mission's authority to impose criminal sanctions
under Section 1464 on licensees who are found in
violation of that section. The Court based this
decision on the legislative histories of these two
statutes, finding that Congress intended to give
meaning to both of these provisions. As the Court
noted, "[r]espect for that intent requires that the
censorship language be read as inapplicable to the
prohibition on broadcasting obscene, indecent or
profane language."ss
The Court rejected the respondent's contention
that the words "indecent" and "obscene," as used
in Sections 14616 and 1464,70 must be interpreted
as proscribing only that material which appeals to
a prurient interest. The Court ruled that whereas
such a construction was proper in the context of
regulating the mails, 7i the reasoning underlying
that construction was inapplicable to the public
broadcast medium. The differences which exist
between the dissemination of patently offensive
matter by means of personal mail and public
broadcast were found to justify the Commission's
interpretation of Section 1464 as encompassing
more than the obscene.7 2 The Court further found
that Congress had intended to impose different
'6 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or con-
strued to give the Commission the power of censor-
ship over the radio communications or signals trans-
mitted by any radio station, and no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Com-
mission which shall interfere with the right of free
speech by means of radio communication.
6, See note 61 supra.
68 98 S. Ct. at 3034.
69 18 U.S.C. § 1461. See also note 11 supra.
70 18 U.S.C. § 1464. See also note 61 supra.
7i 98 S. Ct. at 3035-36 (citing Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. at 99). The Hamling Court reafifined the
holding that § 1461, when applied to obscene material,
alone, does not offend the first and fifth amendments. See
also Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 483 (1962)
(Harlan, J., writing for the plurality), stating: "the statute
[§ 1461] since its inception has always been taken as
aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex."
,- "[Wlhile a nudist magazine may be within the pro-
tection of the First Amendment ... the televising of nudes
might well raise a serious question of programming con-
limitations on these methods of dissemination."
Therefore, the Court concluded that each of the
words of Section 1464, "obscene, indecent or pro-
fane," was to be accorded a separate meaning by
the FCC in its review of public broadcasts.
The respondent had urged that the Commis-
sion's construction of the statutory. language en-
compassed so much constitutionally-protected ma-
terial that the Commission's order was overly broad
and, therefore, in violation of the first amend-
ment.7'4 Writing for the plurality, 5 Justice Stevens
disagreed, stating that the Court's review was lim-
ited to the question of "whether the Commission
has the authority to proscribe this particular broad-
cast." 7 6 The plurality noted that the Commission
had indicated that it "would not impose sanctions
without warnings in cases in which the applicabil-
ity of the law was unclear." Justice Stevens ac-
knowledged that even this safeguard may result in
some broadcasters censoring themselves in an effort
to avoid the possibility of having a broadcast
deemed "indecent." However, he stated that the
Commission's order would suppress only the broad-
casting of "patently offensive references to excre-
tory and sexual organs and activities"78 at mid-
afternoon, when children were likely to be in the
audience. "While some of these references may be
protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First
Amendment concern."
79
The plurality found no absolute first amendment
protection against governmental restrictions on the
public broadcast of indecent language "in any
circumstances." s Rather, both the content and
trary to 18 U.S.C. § 1464." Programming Policy Statement,
44 F.C.C. 2303, 2307 (1960).
73 98 S. Ct. at 3036.
74 The first amendment overbreadth doctrine operates
to invalidate statutes which proscribe protected as well
as unprotected speech. In applying the doctrine, the
courts have refrained from considering whether the activ-
ity before them could have been prohibited under a more
narrowly drawn'statute. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 610-15 (1973).7
s Justice Stevens was joined in his opinion for the
plurality by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.
6 98 S. Ct. at 3037 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 3037. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). There the Court held that
the unique qualities of public broadcasting supported the
constitutionality of the FCC's fairness doctrine, which
required fair and equal coverage be afforded each side of
public issues discussed over radio and television broad-
casts.




context of speech were considered critical to the
determination of first amendment protection. The
Court observed that manyforms of speech may be
regulated or proscribed by the government,8 ' and
although the first amendment guaranteed a
speaker the right to voice his opinions, a speaker
may be constitutionally limited in his choice of
words. The Court ruled that the "vulgar, offensive
and shocking"82 language of the Carlin monologue
exemplified the sort of word choice which may be
subject to governmental restriction, since "such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit thattmay be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality. ' ' ss For these reasons,
the Court concluded that the protection of such
language depended partly upon the context in
which the speech was disseminated.
The Courtss agreed with the FCC that it was
improper to broadcast Carlin's monologue at mid-
afternoon. In so holding the Court found radio
broadcasting entitled to more limited first amend-
ment protection than other forms of communica-
tion85 for two reasons: radio's "persuasive pres-
ence ' in the homes of many Americans, and its
unique accessibility to children.87 The Court rea-
soned that, because the broadcasting audience was
constantly tuning in and out, there was no way to
protect adequately the home listener or viewer
from unexpected program content. The Court con-
cluded that the individual's right to be free from
offensive broadcasts, while in the privacy of his
home, plainly outweighed the first amendment
rights of the broadcaster of indecent materials.!8
s'1d. at 3038. The Court noted that the government
may punish the false shouting of fire in a crowded theater,
see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); it
may forbid speech calculated to provoke a fight, see
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); it
may differentiate between commercial speech and other
varieties, see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977); it may treat libels against private citizens more
severely than libels against public officials, see Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); and, obscenity
may be totally proscribed, see Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973).
82 98 S. Ct. at 3039.
aId. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. at 572).
"4 Powell, J., and Blackmun, J., concurred in this part
of the Court's opinion.
98 S. Ct. at 3040.
8 Id.
88Id. (citing. Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397
U.S. 728 (1970)).
Similarly, the Court found that the government's
interest in the "well being of its youth" 9 and in
supporting "parents' claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their chil-
dren"0 aptly justified the regulation of otherwise
protected materials.9
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Paci-
fica indicated that this "rdlatively new and difficult
area of the law 'M governing the broadcast of offen-
sive material will continue to be met with contro-
versy among the members of the Court. The criti-
cisms voiced by these Justices go to the general
constitutional issues involved in the regulation of
speech.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion expressed
grave misgivings about the plurality's view of the
Court's ability to place a hierarchy of values on the
content of an expression. He stated that such a
judgment is one "for each person to make, not one
for thejudges to impose upon him."93 Powell would
have confined the basis of the decision to the
unique qualities of the broadcast media, combined
with society's interest in protecting youth from
speech "inappropriate for their years," 94 and the
privacy interest of unwilling adults in not being
"assaulted by such offensive speech in their
homes."
95
Justice Brennan, in dissent, criticized the deci-
sion on broader constitutional grounds,' finding
the Court's emphasis on the protection of children
and the privacy interest of the home listener to
have been misplaced. He focused instead on the
willing listener who, because of the Court's deci-
sion, would be prevented from obtaining a Carlin-
type message by means of a public, broidcast.
Brennan cited Cohen v. California,97 which held, inter
alia, that a State cannot, in consonance with the
first and fourteenth amendments, proscribe the
"simple public display ... [of a] single four-letter
expletive s9 8 to protect the unwilling person "from
' Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)'
90 Id. at 639..
91 The Court noted that other forms of indecent expres-
sion may be withheld from children without restricting
the expression at its source. - U.S. at -, 98 S. Ct. at
3040."
Id at 3044 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id at 3047 (Powell, J., concurring).
94Id
96 Justice Brennan also dissented with respect to the
Court's interpretation of § 1464, stating that the section
should be read as a prohibition of obscene speech, only.
Idat 3047 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97403 U.S. 15 (1971).
8 Id. at 26.
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otherwise unavoidable exposure '99 to a "crude
form of protest."'0° He concluded that the privacy
interest asserted by the potentially unwilling au-
dience must be invaded in an "essentially intoler-
able manner"' 0' to justify the suppression of other-
wise protected speech. "Any broader view of this
[the government's] authority would effectively em-
power a majority to silence dissidents simply as a
matter of personal predilections."' 2 Brennan rea-
soned further that, in as much as the radio was a
public medium, an individual's decision to tune-in
at any given time could at most be viewed as an
election to participate in a public discourse; there-
fore, he found no fundamental privacy interest
involved in the reception of a radio broadcast.
Alternatively, Brennan concluded that even if a
privacy interest was involved, an unwilling lis-
tener's momentary exposure to the type of speech
found in the Carlin monologue did not invade that
interest in an "intolerable manner."
Justices Brennan and Marshall commended Pac-
ifica's concern for aiding parents in the rearing of
their children, but found that basing a decision on
that concern was not mandated by precedent. Prior
decisions permitted restriction of the dissemination
to minors of otherwise protected material which
appealed to their prurient interests.'0 3 This, however,
was the first time that the Court had allowed
materials without a prurient appeal to be withheld
from minors. Further, Brennan and Marshall
found that the Court violated the principle of Butler
v. Michigan,1 4 which stated that the State's concern
for the protection of youth could not justify a
statute which reduced the adult population to
"reading only what is fit for children."'l05 Thus, the
two justices concluded, the Court effectively re-
duced the content of public broadcasts to material
suitable for minors; in their opinion, The decision
of whether children should listen to indecent speech
on the radio would best be left to their parents.
One of the dissent's major objections to the





'03 98 S. Ct. at 3050 (Brennan, J.,'dissenting). Brennan
stated that, "Because the Carlin monologue is obviously
not an erotic appeal to the prurient interest of children,
the Court, for the first time, allows the government to
prevent minors from gaining access to materials that are
not obscene, and are therefore protected, as to them." Id.
'04 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
'5 Id. at 383.
majoritarian conception of decency on the minor-
ity. Brennan cited ethnocentric cultural studies for
the proposition that many of the words contained
in Carlin's monologue were used in everyday con-
versations among several subcultures.' 6 Therefore,
Brennan predicted that the Court's decision would
have its greatest impact on broadcasters attempt-
ing to reach these subcultures and on members of
these subcultures who want to listen to those broad-
casters.
Justice Stewart, in a dissent joined by Brennan,
White, and Marshall, criticized the Pacifica major-
ity's interpretation of Sections 1461107 and 1464.208
Finding the legislative history to be silent on
whether the words "indecent" and "obscene" were
intended to have separate meaning under section
1464, Stewart concluded that both statutes must
be construed similarly. The four dissenters thus
contended that the majority had violated a fun-
damental precept of constitutional adjudication:
"the need to construe an Act of Congress so as to




The dissenters' criticism of Pacifica demonstrates
that indecent speech is differentiated from obscene
speech by the absence of a prurient appeal in the
former and the presence of such an appeal in the
latter. Further, speech reviewed for either an ob-
scene or indecent content is evaluated within the
context of its potential audience, which resulted in
the inclusion of children in Pacifica, and the exclu-
sion of children, but the inclusion of sensitive
adults, in Pinkus. Thus, the differences which ex-
isted between the methods of dissemination of the
indecent speech in Pacfica and the obscene speech
alleged in Pinkus explain the majority's concern for
children in Pacfica and lack of concern for children
in Pinkus.
In Pinkus, an adamant, slim majority"0 sought
to refine an established legal concept which the
106 98 S. Ct. at 3054 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing B.
JACKSON, GEr YOUR Ass IN THE WATER AND SWIM LIKE
ME (1974); J. DILLARD, BLACK ENGLISH (1972); and W.
LABOY, LANGUAGE IN THE INNER CITY: STUDIES IN THE
BLACK ENGLISH VERNACULAR (1972)).
107 18 U.S.C. § 1461.
108Id
'09 98 S. Ct. at 3055 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"o ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Blackmun, White,
Rehnquist and Powell did not express a desire to change
the underlying law of obscenity; Justices Stevens, Bren-
nan, Stewart and Marshall did express such a desire.'
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minority preferred to discard. Given the predilec-
tions of the members of the Court, the majority's
decision to exclude children and include sensitive
persons in defining the relevant community was
predictable. The Roth standards required that a
jury view the challenged material through the eyes
of the "average person" in the community. Later,
the Ginsberg Court ruled that where materials were
made available to children, ajury properly consid-
ered the material's prurient appeal to youth."'
That Court held that a state may proscribe the sale
of material to children when the material appealed
to the prurient interest of youth, even though that
material was protected in its distribution to con-
senting adults. 1 2 Such materials may possess ob-
scene qualities in the eyes of the young, but only
indecent qualities in the eyes of adults. Examples
would include materials which lie at the periphery
of protected adult matter. Therefore, in all proba-
bility, Pinkus properly held that a jury should not
consider children when the challenged material
will be available to adults but not to youth.
Although the Court has not had the "occasion
to decide what effect Miller will have on the Ginsberg
formulation,"" 3 the exclusion of children from the
relevant community for the determination of ob-
scenity vel non of adult material should be equally
as applicable under Miller as under Roth. The Miller
Court adopted the "contemporary community
standards""" criteria of Roth and its progeny, mak-
ing this definitional aspect of obscenity identical
under both standards." 5 Similarly, the Court's in-
clusion of sensitive adults in its definition of the
average person in the community was consonant
with prior decisions, and should find equal appli-
cability under both the Roth and Miller standards.
The problem with the majority's approach to
obscenity in Pinkur is that no matter how precisely
the Court defines the attributes of the average
man, at least in the context of obscenity, the jury's
decision will continue to be plagued by subjective
inconsistencies. These inconsistencies are com-
pounded when a jury, striving to envision that
". 390 U.S. at 638.
12Id at 634-35.
' Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 213
n.10.
n4 413 U.S. at 24.
1.r Although the Roth standards, as particularized in
Menoirs, do not explicitly state that a jury must apply an
"average man" standard, as stated in Miller, the Pinkus
decision makes it clear that the "average man" standard
is to be used when applying the Roth test for determining
obscenity vel non. See Pink=, 98 S. Ct. at 1812-14.
chimerical "average man," is required to include
in that formulation the material's prurient appeal
to abnormal groups. These inescapable inconsist-
encies have been the focus of Justice Stevens' crit-
icisms, and the moving force in his efforts to have
criminal sanctions removed from obscenity law.
Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall have
posited more manageable standards for the regu-
lation of obscene materials. They would regulate
the conduct of disseminators of allegedly obscene
material, but not the content of that material.
They maintain that one should be free to dissemi-
nate or receive materials, regardless of content "at
least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or
obstructive exposure to consenting adults."
'
"16
While this standard at first may appear easy to
implement, its effect may move the focus of this
difficult area of the law from the problems encoun-
tered in separating the indecent from the obscene
to the closely related difficulties involved in deter-
mining "obstructive exposure" vel non and deciding
what material is inappropriate for juveniles. That
is, the standards for determining 'obstructive ex-
posure' and suitability for youth will be analogous
to the obscenity standards announced in Miller.
The Court's reluctance in Pacifica to identify
standards applicable to the determination of in-
decency vel non indicates that the law of indecency
will also remain unsettled in years, to come- More-
over, in holding the Carlin monologue indecent,
the Court attached a meaning to "indecent speech"
which encompassed more than a possible appeal to
a prurient interest." 7 What the Court did state in
Pafica was that its basic predisposition, supporting
the right of parents to rear their children as they
wish and protecting the home from offensive intru-
sions, will permeate the law of indecency. These
concerns have weighed heavily in the area of ob-
scenity, where decisions such as Ginsberg"8 and
Rowan"9 have established them as clear boundaries
on the distribution of sexually offensive materials.
The Ginsberg Court held that a state's constitu-
tional power to regulate the dissemination of offen-
sive materials to youth was premised on two justi-
fications: the state's respect for the right of parents
to raise their children as they deem proper2m and
the state's independent interest in the well being of
"'Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 113
(Brennan, Stewart and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
17 See 98 S. Ct. at 3050 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"8 390 U.S. 629.
n9 397 U.S. 728.
m 390 U.S. at 639.
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its youth.' 2 ' The Pacifica Court -incorporated both
of these interests into the law of indecency by
allowing the FCC to regulate the Carlin monologue
"as broadcast."' 2 It was only by confining Paciflca
to the speech "as broadcast" that the decision may
have been consistent with Erznoznik v. City ofJack-
sonville,'23 where the Court held that a statute
prohibiting a motion picture, containing any nude
scenes, from being exhibited if the screen was visi-
ble from any public place, was "broader than
permissible" under the first amendment. 24 There-
fore, the Pacifica decision cannot be read to allow
the FCC to proscribe all offensive speech.
The Pacifica Court's reliance on Rowan'25 for the
proposition that an individual's privacy interest
supported the FCC action was not as well founded
as its protection of children rationale. In Rowan,
the Court held that a statute which allowed an
individual to censor his own mail did not offend
the first amendment rights of the mailor. The
Pacifca decision, however, removed that exercise of
choice from the individual and placed it with a
govermental agency.'26 Such a decision could only
be justified by the Court's explicit adoption of a
standard which extended varying degrees of first
amendment protection to different modes of com-
munication.'
27
The concern for privacy and the protection of
children provided the basis for the narrow Pacifca
decision: offensive speech may be restricted from
entering the home of an unwilling audience or an
audience compiled of children. 128 The problem
121 Id. at 640. See also Pacfica, 98 S. Ct. at 3035-36.
'22 The term, "as broadcast," must be read as relating
to that particular time of the day when children are likely
to be in the audience.
'23 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
'2Id. at 213.
'2 98 S. Ct. at 3040. (citing 397 U.S. 728).
r26Justice Stevens wrote for the Court in Pacfica,
upholding the FCC's regulation of indecent speech. This
is contrary to the "marketplace" approach he has
adopted with respect to obscenity law. See Smith v.
United States, 431 U.S. 291, 311 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) and
Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 602 (1977) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
'2 See Pacfica, 98 S. Ct. at 3039-40, stating that, of all
forms of communication, radio broadcast has received
the most limited first amendment protection (citing Jo-
seph Burnstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952):
"Each method [of communication] tends to present its
own peculiar problems." Id at 503).
2 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). The
Cohen Court upheld the right of a person to use offensive
language, in a public place, to express a political opinion.
with the Court's decision was that it provided no
standards for determining indecency vel non, leav-
ing that judgment to the FCC. Future cases will
undoubtedly impel the law of indecency toward
the same definitional problems which have plagued
the law of obscenity. The problem is further com-
pounded in the law of indecent speech by the fact
that speakers' opinions receive protection, but the
words used to express those opinions may be subject
to restrictions.1 2 The law of obscenity avoids this
dilemma by focusing on prurient appeal alone, and
not on the method of communicating that ap-
peal. 13°
Pacifica implied that, in different "contexts," the
author must use different language to express the
same idea. However, the Court has previously rec-
ognized the dangers of such a requirement, stating
in Cohen v. California that "we cannot indulge the
facile assumption that one can forbid particular
words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process.", 3 ' Further, re-
quiring that an author select his language to suit
the context of his speech may often result in a
"sterilized message,"' 2 devoid of the author's per-
sonality and failing to "convey the emotion that is
an essential part of so many communications."'
1
Justice Brennan alluded to these communication
difficulties in his Pacifica dissent, when he spoke of
the Court's neglect for the concerns of ethnocentric
subcultures whose speech commonly included
words which the majority of the country would
find offensive.ls Such concerns will raise in the
future the issue of the relevant geographic com-
munity to be considered in determining the inde-
cency vel non of a broadcast. The Miller Court held
that in determining obscenity vel non, a jury may
not be instructed to apply a national community
standard1ss However, an anomalous situation is
created by the FCC's role in determining the in-
decency vel non of a broadcast, because that deter-
i29 See Pacifica, 98 S. Ct. at 3038-39.
'30 In Roth and subsequent obscenity decisions the
Court has held that the trier of fact must instruct the
jury to consider a work as a whole in determining the
prurient appeal vel non of that challenged material. 354
U.S. at 489.
131 403 U.S. at 26.
"2 98 S. Ct. at 3053 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' Id Justice Brennan also contends that, even though
the Court's decision does not prevent an adult from
purchasing the Carlin record or attending one of his live
performances, interested listeners may be precluded from
this material by their own financial constraints.
13 Id at 3054 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'-'413 U.S. at 30.
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mination is not dependent upon "lay jurors."'6
This difference would seem to allow the Federal
Communications Commission to adopt a national
standard.
Therefore, the geographic boundaries of the rel-
evant public broadcast community should be es-
tablished, logically, by the station's physical br6ad-
cast range. That community should be comprised
of all persons, including children, who might be
expected to be in the audience at the time of the
broadcast. This conclusion is compelled by the
Court's analogous decision in Pinkus, where the
availability of the challenged material to sensitive
persons and the inaccessibility of children to that
material dictated that the former group be in-
cluded, and the latter group excluded, from the
jury's evaluation of that material.
136 I.
CONCLUSION
Pacifica demonstrates that the regulation of of-
fensive speech, even if based on the mode of dissem-
ination of that material, cannot avoid at least a
cursory review of the content of that material.
Indeed, it is the content of the material which
determines the permissible time, manner and place
of its dissemination. 3 7 The disharmony within the
Court, evidenced by the Pinkus obscenity holding
and the Pacifica indecency decision, suggests that
the Court will not be able to establish standards
relating offensive materials to their permissible
modes of distribution which will satisfy more than
a slight majority of the members of the Court.
137 It must be recognized that, under the present ob-
scenity standards, there are no permissible modes for
disseminating materials which are found to be obscene.
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
